rent

Related: fund, hire, interest, invest, lease, tarrif, tax

Owners of property held public must receive rent from users as compensation for real costs, including the difficult to calculate costs of exclusion.

In the GNU Society, price above cost is treated as payer investment.

We might taper the rent-cycle from the outskirts a city toward focal points - so that buildings, performance stages, showers, restaurant grills, smoothie machines, bowling lanes, computer equipment, car garages, etc. at these hot-spots would be leased for very short periods of time - maybe even just 1 minute intervals - so that artists may be a jack of any trade whenever qualified.

Short intervals are not appropriate for everyone or everything, so the rent-cycles would be longer the further from these centers.

Zoning may be neccessary to determine fault when somebody complains about pollution such as noise or smell.

==Free Hardware Rental
A renter must hold enough insurance points to cover the predicted costs of misuse.

For example:
# A homeless drifter wanders into town.
# He is attracted to a sign-post advertising jobs.
# Employment involving low-cost tools in public areas such as sweeping and shoveling may require 0 points of insurance.
# He chooses a job load and contacts the employer.
# He earns the points promised - but only if the job is done correctly (how is this determined?)
# Let's say he did a great job and earned 100 points that day.
# He rents a shower stall at 2 points/hr and buys water at 0.1 point/gallon, and soap, towel etc., all at 'cost' unless there is more demand than supply*.
# He then goes to dinner which costs 5 points, and rents a motel for 5 points.
# In the morning he still has about 80 points, so can choose to do work that requires at least that much insurance, or can just spend those points.

* When demand is more than supply, users pays a price above cost as usual, but that profit is treated as an investment in more physical sources for that same user.

Wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_rent (usury):
"'Karl Marx agreed with Henry George and with the classical economists that this land-rent was a form of exploitation. Land-owners were able to get "something for nothing" just because they controlled such important natural resources. To Marx, the land-owners received a part of capitalist society's surplus-value that was redistributed from the industrial sector, where workers produced it. However, unlike other economists, Marx also saw industrial capitalists as rentiers who simply extracted economic surplus from labor, while otherwise contributing nothing to the economy.

Returns to sunk cost investments in specialized capital equipment do have some of the same qualities as land rent, in that, once the sunk cost investment in specialized equipment is made, the price necessary to bring the capital equipment into the use for which it was designed may be much less than would be necessary to repay the original cost of investment. The difference between the amount necessary to bring a sunk cost investment into productive use and the amount actually earned has been termed a quasi-rent. It is not a true rent, because there would have to be an expectation of economic return in order to induce the original investment; and, if the investment was not repaid, the specialized asset may be allowed to wear out, without repair or replenishment, in such use as could be obtained. Nevertheless, the existence of quasi-rents can create paradoxical situations. A railroad, for example, consists of large, sunk cost investments in right-of-way, rail and rolling stock, with the objective of being able to transport people or goods at a very low variable cost. The alternative uses of the specialized capital stock of a railroad, for other than railroading, are, typically, few and poor. Once the sunk cost investment is made, it is in the interest of the railroad to accept shipments at rates, which cover the low variable cost, even when the rate does not offer an adequate return on the sunk cost investment in right-of-way, rail and rolling stock.

Modern neoclassical economics has generalized the concept of rent to suggest that the owner of any kind of input can receive income for that input, in excess of what is necessary to put the factor into a particular productive use. The rent, in this conception, is the difference between what is paid and the opportunity cost, represented by the income available in the next, best use of the factor.

Rent can be viewed as an estimate of how much market prices for an input would have to change, before the allocation of that particular input would change. How much would the price of maize have to fall relative other crops, before a given field would be planted in rice or potatoes or alfalfa or some other crop instead of maize? A field particularly well-suited to maize, but not other crops, could be said to be earning a rent as a maize field, to the extent that the amount actually earned as a maize field exceeded the absolute minimum amount necessary to allocate the field to maize, as opposed to its next best use, i.e. its opportunity cost.

As another example, an excellent professional basketball player typically earns much more income than is necessary to compensate him or her for the training, effort, practice, and the like needed to become a player. In the presence of the productivity enhancing effects of large arenas and television broadcasting, which allow team owners to sell the right to view games to very large numbers of customers, a few highly talented basketball players compete for a relatively few, highly compensated slots on pro teams. The difference between the minimum amount of money putatively needed to get a Michael Jordan to make the human capital investment into becoming such an excellent player (adjusted for probability and risk aversion), and the amount actually paid Michael Jordan to play for the Chicago Bulls, may be termed a rent.

The generalization of the concept of rent to include quasi-rents and returns above opportunity cost has served to highlight the role of barriers to competition in determining and creating rents. A person seeking to become a medical doctor makes a huge sunk cost investment in medical training and education, which has limited potential application outside of medical practice. In a competitive market for medical services, a doctor's wages would be bid down, until the expected net return on the sunk cost investment in training would be near zero, that is, barely enough to justify making the investment. In a sense, the required investment becomes a barrier to entry, discouraging would-be doctors from making the necessary investment in training to enter the competitive market for medical services, when the return on the necessary sunk cost investment is competed away. Restrictions on the numbers of people entering into the competitive market for medical services, however, would have the effect of raising the return on investments in medical training, without increasing the number of entrants to the market. Associations of doctors have been known to lobby government to limit, in various ways, the number of medical schools training medical doctors and the number of medical students at those institutions. This kind of political activity is sometimes termed rent-seeking, though the returns realized from such political activities might be more akin to monopoly profits than rents, as generally conceived. Monopoly profits are sometimes called monopoly rents.
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Two types of factor rent

    * Classical factor rent -- This is the return to a factor above and beyond the amount necessary to induce the supplier to offer the input to the market. This corresponds to the notion of a producers' surplus or "scarcity rent." This type of economic rent arises because of scarcity in the supply of inputs. If factor supply is perfectly elastic, there would be no producers' surplus and no economic rents.

    * Paretian factor rent - This is the return to a factor above and beyond the amount that the factor supplier would receive in its next-best alternative use. This type of economic rent draws on the notion of opportunity costs. For example, if someone is earning $20,000 for a job, and the next best job pays $15,000, then the economic rent is the difference between the two: $5,000.

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See also

    * list of economics topics
    * Quasi-rent
    * Rent-seeking
    * Hotelling rent
    * Ricardian rent
    * von ThUnen rent
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